(2021-02-26) The Make Me Do It Myth

The “Make Me Do It” Myth. In early 2009, as Barack Obama prepared to move into the White House, a particular historical anecdote rapidly gained in popularity. FDR listened to their position and considered the demands they presented. Then he replied, “You’ve convinced me. I agree with what you’ve said. Now go out and make me do it.”

In recent years, this tale has often been used to encourage social movements to maintain pressure on elected officials, even sympathetic ones, once these politicians assume power. There’s only one problem: the story isn’t true.

it is valuable to consider what the story gets right about the relationship between movements and presidents, and what it gets wrong.

As Joe Biden begins his first term in the White House, the stakes of this discussion are considerable.

social movements can play a critical role under the new administration. But Biden isn’t going to like it.

Ta-Nehisi Coates describes the moral of the story, “[P]oliticians respond to only one thing—power. This is not the flaw of democracy, it’s the entire point. It’s the job of activists to generate, and apply, enough pressure on the system to affect change.”

What the story gets wrong, however, may be just as important as the valid lesson that its tellers intend to impart.

The anecdote leaves out the indignation and contempt that inside-game players feel when their dealmaking expertise and political hesitancy are called into question.

Obama’s Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel, who later became mayor of Chicago, used more pointed language against those who sought to make the president and other members of his party pursue bolder policy positions. He condemned those who attacked conservative Democrats for failing to support a public option for healthcare reform as being “fucking retarded”

A similar contempt for organizers who dared challenge the expertise of veteran lawmakers was on display in the Bay Area office of Senator Dianne Feinstein in February 2019. There, the senator rebuffed a group of school-age advocates from the Sunrise Movement who prodded her to support Green New Deal legislation. In the viral video of the incident, Feinstein chided the young activists, saying “You know what’s interesting about this group: I’ve been doing this for 30 years, I know what I’m doing.”

LBJ’s relationship with the civil rights movement was more often characterized by conflict than cooperation. For his part, FDR was often enraged at labor unions that tried to force his hand in demanding stronger action on behalf of striking workers.

Rather than directing constituents to take to the streets, it is far more common for elected officials to fear the disruptive possibilities of a mobilized base.

once in office, they cease to see their fortunes as being connected to these movements. With their focus on maintaining power, they often view concessions to their grassroots base as threatening to their wider coalition, particularly the business interests that support them

Even when the policies these leaders promote are relatively good ones, the insider “I’ll take it from here” attitude promotes a dangerous demobilization.

Obama’s 2008 drive had defied the rules of typically top-down presidential campaigns, empowering a vast range of grassroots activity by supporters.

In a February 2017 New Republic article entitled “Obama’s Lost Army,” journalist Micah Sifry, using previously unreported insider memos and emails (including documents from adviser John Podesta that were released by Wikileaks), documented that, even before Obama was elected, party insiders managed to squelch the idea of an autonomous organization. (2017-02-12) Sifry Inside The Fall Of Obamas Grassroots Army

advisers convinced Obama to hand over the entire grassroots apparatus to the Democratic National Committee (DNC).

In the crucial months immediately after the 2008 election, the “movement moment” rapidly dissipated as supporters were left without direction about how their energies would be institutionalized. When it did launch, Organizing for America, or OFA, as the DNC-managed group became known, was a shadow of what its original advocates had imagined.

it was designed to be a safely on-message cheering section

As it turned out, over the course of the administration’s first year, career insiders such as Rahm Emanuel would find themselves out-organized by right-wingers who channeled discontent into Tea Party groups that were unafraid to deploy disruptive protest and to target even Republican leaders they found insufficiently responsive

Christopher Edley Jr., a policy adviser to the Obama campaign who had pushed for a robust and independent organization, argued that the Washington, D.C.-minded political hands closest to the president adhered to a theory of change focused on insider dealmaking.

they were fearful that a mobilized base could turn on powerful Democrats, or even the president himself.

There is a price to the demobilization engendered by this approach to governing. It is taken as conventional wisdom that the majority party will lose seats in midterm elections, and this was certainly the case in 2010

Even when the active engagement of their base in ongoing political advocacy enhances their ability to succeed, it is foolhardy to believe that politicians secretly welcome pressure or that they will pay tribute to those who, on select occasions, are able to force their hands.

Those pushing for transformative changes to our society should expect to hear nothing different. And the ultimate success of the current administration may rely on them not listening.