Computational Theory of Mind

Family of views in the philosophy of mind. Not to be confused with Theory of computation or Pancomputationalism. In philosophy of mind, the computational theory of mind (CTM), also known as computationalism, is a family of views that hold that the human mind is an information processing system and that cognition and consciousness together are a form of computation. It is closely related to functionalism, a broader theory that defines mental states by what they do rather than what they are made of. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computational_theory_of_mind

  • Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts (1943) were the first to suggest that neural activity is computational. They argued that neural computations explain cognition. A version of the theory was put forward by Peter Putnam and Robert W. Fuller in 1964. The theory was proposed in its modern form by Hilary Putnam in 1960 and 1961, aided by his then PhD student, philosopher and cognitive scientist Jerry Fodor, who continued the research as a post-doc in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. It was later criticized in the 1990s by Putnam himself, John Searle, and others. The computational theory of mind holds that the human mind is a computational system that is realized (i.e., physically implemented) by neural activity in the brain.
  • Computation is commonly understood in terms of Turing machines which manipulate symbols according to a rule, in combination with the internal state of the machine. The critical aspect of such a computational model is that we can abstract away from particular physical details of the machine that is implementing the computation.
  • Computational theories of mind are often said to require mental representation because 'input' into a computation comes in the form of symbols or representations of other objects. A computer cannot compute an actual object but must interpret and represent the object in some form and then compute the representation. The computational theory of mind is related to the representational theory of mind
  • Computational theory of mind is not the same as the computer metaphor, comparing the mind to a modern-day digital computer.
  • A range of arguments have been proposed against physicalist conceptions used in computational theories of mind.
  • An early, though indirect, criticism of the computational theory of mind comes from philosopher John Searle. In his thought experiment known as the Chinese room, Searle attempts to refute the claims that artificially intelligent agents can be said to have intentionality and understanding and that these systems, because they can be said to be minds themselves, are sufficient for the study of the human mind.
  • Roger Penrose has proposed the idea that the human mind does not use a knowably sound calculation procedure to understand and discover mathematical intricacies. This would mean that a normal Turing complete computer would not be able to ascertain certain mathematical truths that human minds can. The application of Gödel's theorem by Penrose to demonstrate it, however, was widely criticized, and is considered erroneous.
  • Pancomputationalism CTM raises a question that remains a subject of debate: what does it take for a physical system (such as a mind, or an artificial computer) to perform computations? A very straightforward account is based on a simple mapping between abstract mathematical computations and physical systems: a system performs computation C if and only if there is a mapping between a sequence of states individuated by C and a sequence of states individuated by a physical description of the system.
  • Daniel Dennett proposed the multiple drafts model, in which consciousness seems linear but is actually blurry and gappy, distributed over space and time in the brain. Consciousness is the computation, there is no extra step in which you become conscious of the computation.
  • Jerry Fodor argues that mental states, such as beliefs and desires, are relations between individuals and mental representations. He maintains that these representations can only be correctly explained in terms of a language of thought (LOT) in the mind. Further, this language of thought itself is codified in the brain, not just a useful explanatory tool.
  • Steven Pinker described language instinct as an evolved, built-in capacity to learn language (if not writing). His 1997 book How the Mind Works sought to popularize the computational theory of mind for wide audiences.

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